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“See the sound. It crashes in. All around. It gets in. Guns in the sky, child 
grows up to see guns in the sky, used to be on TV.”—INXS 
INTRODUCTION 
“1 October,” the event and the memory, invoke numerous emotions for 
many Las Vegas locals. Since the latter months of 2017, thousands of vehicles 
around the Mojave Desert have displayed stickers showing “#VegasStrong.” 
The city came together in the aftermath of the sudden tragedy. Within a few 
days of the shooting, Las Vegas residents donated nearly 800 units of blood to 
local blood banks.1 
On October 1, 2017, in a matter of only ten minutes,2 Stephen Paddock 
unleashed a hail of over 1,000 rounds of ammunition from his hotel room.3 He 
checked into a room on the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and seemed 
to have plotted to end the lives of as many people as possible before taking his 
own, but no motive was ever found.4 At 10:05 p.m., Paddock hammered 
through the glass of his hotel room window and began shooting at a crowd of 
people attending the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival about 500 yards away.5 
Chaos ensued below as concertgoers ran and took cover.6 The shooting stopped 
at 10:15 p.m., and Paddock was pronounced dead shortly thereafter.7 
According to official reports, Paddock had no motive. But he did have 
twenty-four firearms, at least twelve of which were fitted with bump stocks.8 
Although he was deemed a “sober, healthy 64-year-old,” Paddock’s doctor 
 
1  Mass Shootings Trigger Blood Donations, SCIENCE DAILY (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/10/181029130930.htm [https://perma.cc/8HD2-
8PQX]. 
2  LVMPD CRIM. INVESTIGATIVE REP. OF THE 1 OCTOBER MASS CASUALTY SHOOTING, at 49 
(2018). 
3  See id. at 106–07 (2018). 
4  LVMPD PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE REP. 1 OCTOBER/MASS CASUALTY SHOOTING, at 7, 
52 (2018). 
5  The Las Vegas Shooter Had a Cheap Modification that Made His Rifles More Deadly, 
PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/las-vegas-shooter-
cheap-modification-made-rifles-deadly [https://perma.cc/9E4F-K5W8]. 
6  Sally Ho & Regina Garcia Cano, ‘I’m Going To Die’: Fear Grips Vegas Strip; Gunman 
Kills 59, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 2, 2017, 10:10 PM), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/nation_world/20171002_ap_4eeaef2efced49698855d138
30de3327.html [https://perma.cc/6K66-JFM8]. 
7  See Why Did It Take Police So Long To Breach Las Vegas Gunman’s Room? Here’s a 




8  Larry Buchanan, et al., What Is a Bump Stock and How Does It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/04/us/bump-stock-las-vegas-
gun.html [https://perma.cc/QYF6-45EP]. 
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believed that he may have had bipolar disorder.9 Potential mental conditions 
aside, he spent the final moments of his life wreaking physical and 
psychological havoc on hundreds of innocent people who have since suffered 
and will continue to suffer for years to come. All told, Paddock killed 60 and 
injured hundreds,10 making 1 October the deadliest mass shooting in modern 
U.S. History.11 
This atrocity led lawmakers to wonder: What was to be done? Historically, 
Nevada lawmakers had taken a laissez-faire approach to firearm regulation.12 
After all, Nevada is the epitome of the Wild West. But Nevadans eventually 
tired of unregulated firearm use and resolved to make a change.13 
1 October was not the first tragedy of its kind. Mass shootings take place 
throughout the country in a variety of contexts. Some of the most well-known, 
recent mass shootings include the 2018 Parkland High School shooting; the 
2016 shooting at Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida; and the 2012 shooting at 
Sandy Hook Elementary School.14 
Following almost every mass shooting, a surge of support for gun reform 
swells and then fizzles out. Perhaps some form of legislation or regulation is 
passed, and the next several years are spent litigating its contours. In this White 
Paper, we will outline the various legislative provisions passed by Nevada 
lawmakers, including the omnibus bill following 1 October.15 We will also 
analyze litigation that has proceeded as a result of the mass shooting. Finally, 
we will offer suggestions for lawmakers and jurists to solve present and future 
problems. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I will outline Nevada’s history and 
initiatives to produce firearm legislation from the state’s founding to just before 
the 1 October tragedy. Part II will discuss the executive and legislative actions 
following 1 October. Part III will discuss a case currently pending in the United 
 
9  Amy B. Wang & Mark Berman, Las Vegas Shooter Was Sober, Autopsy Finds, Leaving 
His Motives a Mystery, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2018, 11:18 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/02/10/las-vegas-shooter-was-
sober-autopsy-finds-leaving-his-motives-a-mystery/ [https://perma.cc/RS9B-UTES]. 
10  Katelyn Newberg, Sisolak: ‘We Will Never, Never Forget’ Those Killed in Oct. 1 
Shooting, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 5:39 AM), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/sisolak-we-will-never-never-forget-
those-killed-in-oct-1-shooting-2134042/ [https://perma.cc/47QG-RGME]; Ricardo Torres-
Cortez, Sheriff Updates Number of People Injured in Strip Shooting to 851, LAS VEGAS SUN 
(Jan. 19, 2018, 8:11AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2018/jan/19/sheriff-to-provide-
update-about-strip-mass-shootin/ [https://perma.cc/XX5W-9KQY]. 
11  Kalhan Rosenblatt, Las Vegas Shooting is Deadliest in Modern U.S. History, NBC NEWS 
(Aug. 20, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/las-vegas-shooting/las-
vegas-shooting-deadliest-modern-u-s-history-n806486 [https://perma.cc/EZ7S-KP64]. 
12  See infra Part I(A). 
13  See, e.g., infra Part I(B). 
14  Deadliest Mass Shootings in the US Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 14, 2021, 2:32 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/19/us/mass-shootings-fast-facts [https://perma.cc/DG7F-
GGDL]. 
15  A.B. 291, 2019 Leg.,80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
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States District Court, District of Nevada, which arose out of the 1 October 
shooting. Part IV will then address the questions certified by the United States 
District Court to the Supreme Court of Nevada regarding statutes that 
immunize firearm manufacturers and criminalize the production and 
distribution of machine guns. 
I. NEVADA HISTORY AND FIREARMS LEGISLATION 
This section outlines Nevada’s history of regulating firearms prior to the 1 
October shooting. Subsection A details Nevada’s minimalist approach to 
firearms regulation in the 1800s. Subsection B focuses on modern firearms 
statutes in Nevada. 
A. After Achieving Statehood, Nevada Began Regulating Weapons in the Wild 
West 
The United States was in the midst of the Civil War when President 
Lincoln signed an enabling act for Nevada statehood on March 21, 1864.16 This 
Act provided that the residents of the territory of Nevada could form a state for 
admission into the Union if they wrote a constitution which contained several 
provisions, including that there be no slavery in the newly formed state.17 In 
1864, Lincoln was running for re-election and, because the residents of the 
Nevada territory were largely Republican and pro-Union, Congress pushed the 
Act through, looking for support for Lincoln and the abolition of slavery 
through the Thirteenth Amendment.18 
The Nevada constitutional convention met and authored the state 
constitution and Nevada’s voters approved it on September 7, 1864.19 To save 
time, the constitutional convention telegraphed the constitution to Washington, 
D.C., and President Lincoln declared Nevada to be a state on October 31, 1864: 
just eight days before the presidential election.20 This rush toward statehood 
during the tumultuous Civil War led Nevada to be dubbed the “Battle Born” 
state.21 
 Nevada’s turbulent beginning produced an environment ripe for 
lawlessness. With its rich Comstock Lode, it is no wonder that after the war 
brave prospectors flocked to Nevada, the Wild West, where silver could be 
 
16  Jerome Edwards, Nevada Statehood, ONLINE NEV. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 21, 2009), 
https://www.onlinenevada.org/articles/nevada-statehood [https://perma.cc/8A7N-8D8M]. 
17  Act of Congress (1864) Enabling the People of Nevada to Form a Constitution and State 
Government, 13 Stat. 30–31, 38 Cong. Ch. 36, §§ 1, 4 (1864). 
18  Utah-Nevada Territory, NSLA, https://nsla.nv.gov/utah-nevada-territory 
[https://perma.cc/4NXE-YV9A]. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
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mined from the ground and lawlessness was the norm.22 The mines attracted all 
sorts of colorful characters: outlaws like A.J. “Smiling Jack” Davis, a mill 
owner turned stagecoach and train robber; John “Three-Fingered Jack” 
McDowell, a gang leader who served as a hired killer; and “Fighting Sam” 
Brown, who was said to enjoy killing so much that he shot a man in the back 
for sport.23 These dangerous men may have inspired the new state legislature to 
rapidly enact legislation to regulate the use of firearms and bring Nevada under 
control. 
The Nevada Constitution contained Nevada’s first firearm regulation. 
Nevada’s first legislative session was held from December 12, 1864, through 
March 11, 1865.24 During that session, no legislation was passed regarding 
firearms.25 However, the published statutes from that session contained the 
original Nevada state constitution.26 The constitution provided the rules 
governing eligibility to hold office in the state and included the provision that 
no “person who . . . fought a duel with a deadly weapon . . . shall be allowed to 
hold any office.”27 The constitution also provided that the “Legislature shall 
provide by law for giving force and effect to this section.”28 Although this 
provision does not regulate firearms specifically or weapons in general, this is 
the first known Nevada legislation that mentioned deadly weapons. 
The second legislative session brought a second mention of weapons, also 
with regard to dueling.29 This legislation concerned officers who failed to 
prevent a duel30: 
If any . . . officer . . . shall have knowledge of an intention . . . of any two 
persons, to fight with a deadly weapon or weapons, and such officer shall not 
use and exert his official authority to arrest the parties, and prevent the deed, 
every such officer shall be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.31 
This was the second piece of early Nevada legislation directed at dueling.32 
At this point in the state’s history, people who participated in duels were 
banned from the privilege of holding office, and officers who failed to 
intervene in duels could be punished with a monetary fine. 
 
22  Ron Soodalter, Stand and Deliver! Nevada’s Outlaws Earned Their Fearsome 
Reputations, NEV. MAG. (July-Aug 2017), https://nevadamagazine.com/issue/july-august-
2017/4448/ [https://perma.cc/T965-3FZG]. 
23  Id. 
24  See JOHN CHURCH, STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEVADA PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF 
THE LEGISLATURE, at Title Page (1864–65). 
25  See generally id. at iii-x (showing no reference to potential firearm legislation). 
26  See, e.g., id. at 41–43 (1864–65) (showing the Preamble and Article I—Declaration of 
Rights from the Nevada Constitution). 
27  NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 3, in JOHN CHURCH, STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEVADA PASSED 
AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, at 61 (1864–65). 
28  Id. 
29   CHURCH, supra note 24, at 245 (Ch. CVIII, Sec. 70) (1866). 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id.; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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The first legislation passed in Nevada that resembles modern-day statutes 
was passed in the third legislative session and approved on February 27, 
1867.33 This legislation entitled, “An Act to prohibit carrying of Concealed 
Weapons,”34 created Nevada’s first concealed carry statute. This Act provided 
that “[e]very person, not being a peace officer or traveler, who shall wear or 
carry any dirk, pistol, sword in a cane, slung-shot, or other dangerous or deadly 
weapon concealed, shall . . . be deemed guilty of misdemeanor.”35 Although 
Nevada’s firearms statutes have gone through multiple revisions since they 
were initially penned, this statute has remained in a substantially similar 
format.36 The current statute prohibits a person from “carry[ing] concealed 
upon his or her person any pistol, revolver or other firearm, or other dangerous 
or deadly weapon or pneumatic gun.”37 
B. Modern Firearms Legislation, Pre-2019 
Firearms laws in Nevada are the exclusive domain of the state Legislature 
and are codified in NRS §§ 202.253–202.369.38 Prior to 2015, Nevada law 
provided limited authority to Clark County to require registration of 
concealable firearms.39 The Clark County ordinance required that “any resident 
of the county receiving title to a pistol . . . shall, within seventy-two 
hours . . . personally appear at the county sheriff’s office . . . for the purpose of 
registering the same.”40 Upon registration, the owner was given a “blue card” 
as a receipt.41 Normally, sellers would fill out the blue card for the purchaser 
and file the paperwork to the Sheriff as part of the registration process.42 
On June 2, 2015, Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval signed Senate Bill 175 
into law.43 This bill preempted the county registration ordinance and 
“establish[ed] state control over the regulation of and policies concerning 
firearms . . . to ensure that such regulation and policies are uniform throughout 
 
33  JOSEPH E. ECKLEY, STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEVADA PASSED AT THE THIRD SESSION OF 
THE LEGISLATURE, 66 (1867). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(d)(3) (2021). 
37  Id. § 202.350(2)(d)(3). 
38  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.364(1)(b) (2021). There are multiple laws concerning firearms 
in the Nevada Revised Statutes and to provide an overview of them in their entirety would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. Some Nevada laws are provided above for background and 
informational purposes. 
39  NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.364(3) (2015). 
40  Blue Cards: Clark County Handgun Registration, NEVADA CARRY, 
https://www.nevadacarry.org/blue-cards.html [https://perma.cc/4YRA-RJLL] (showing that 
Clark County Code 12.04.110 was preempted by NRS 244.364). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Sandra Chereb, Sandoval Signs Gun, School Choice Bills Into Law, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 
(June 3, 2015, 9:49 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-
government/nevada/sandoval-signs-gun-school-choice-bills-into-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZL4-PYF2]. 
40 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 5  
this State.”44 Additionally, when this bill was signed, it provided that the 
“regulation of the . . . registration and licensing of firearms . . . is within the 
exclusive domain of the Legislature, and any other law, regulation, rule or 
ordinance to the contrary is null and void.”45 At first glance, the preemption of 
the county registration requirement may seem overly lenient; however, as of 
2019 only seven states and the District of Columbia required certain firearms to 
be registered, eight states expressly prohibited registration and the remaining 
states were silent on the matter.46 In retrospect, this may have signified a 
nationwide trend toward leniency in firearm regulations prior to 2019. 
Currently, Nevada law provides that a concealed firearm “permit is valid 
for any handgun which is owned or thereafter obtained by the person to whom 
the permit is issued.”47 Between 2007 and 2013, the statute limited the 
concealed carry permit to “revolvers and semiautomatic firearms.”48 This 
change indicates the legislature’s willingness to broaden Nevada residents’ 
ability to carry concealed firearms. When it comes to concealed firearm 
permits, Nevada is a “shall-issue” state.49 At present, there are forty-one shall-
issue states.50 Taken together, these two laws demonstrate Nevada lawmakers’ 
permissive views on concealed carry. 
In 2003, the Nevada legislature added a statute governing machine guns.51 
The “machine gun” statute, NRS 202.350(1)(b), provides that “a person within 
 
44  S.B. 175 § 8(1)(a), 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015). 
45  Id. § 8(1)(b). 
46  See Firearm Registration Requirements by State, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Firearm_registration_requirements_by_state [https://perma.cc/5JG6-
3WRH] (the places requiring registration include California, Michigan, New York, Hawaii, 
Maryland, Connecticut, New Jersey, and D.C.; the states that prohibit registration are 
Florida, Georgia, South Dakota, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vermont, and Rhode 
Island). 
47  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657(2) (2021). 
48  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657(2) (prior to 2013 amendment). 
49  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657(3) (2021) (“[T]he sheriff shall issue a permit to any person 
who is qualified to possess a handgun.”). Shall-issue state regulations still require carriers to 
apply for a permit, but the state has no discretion to determine whether the permit will be 
issued: as long as the applicant meets all of the requirements, such as the background check, 
the state will issue the permit. May-Issue vs. Shall-Issue Concealed Carry States, USCCA 
(Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/blog/may-issue-vs-shall-issue-
concealed-carry-states/ [https://perma.cc/B3Y9-A2LQ]. This shall-issue requirement is less 
strict than a state with “may issue” regulations, where the state has discretion on the issuance 
of the permit, even if the applicant meets all of the specified requirements. Id. 
50  See Shall Issue, USCCA, 
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/resources/terminology/types-of-concealed-carry-
licensurepermitting-policies/shall-issue/ [https://perma.cc/ZDQ5-QK7Y] (showing a map 
with 41 states highlighted in yellow; the nine “may-issue” states include California, Hawaii, 
New York, Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Massachusetts). 
51  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2021). Section 202 of the Nevada Revised Statutes 
provides several laws under the general heading of “Weapons” which concern “Dangerous 
Weapons and Firearms.” See NEV. REV. STATS. § 202 (2021) (showing “Weapons” and 
“Dangerous Weapons and Firearms” as subsections). Statutes in this section refer to weapons 
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this state shall not . . . manufacture or cause to be manufactured, or import into 
the State, or keep, offer or expose for sale, or give, lend, possess or use a 
machine gun . . . unless authorized by federal law.”52 The “machine gun” 
statute came from a bill sponsored by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department with the intent to mirror federal law, allowing Nevada law 
enforcement to independently regulate these firearms without relying on federal 
involvement or oversight.53 Nevada law defines a machine gun as “any weapon 
which shoots, is designed to shoot or can be readily restored to shoot more than 
one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.”54 The 
“machine gun” statute has remained unchanged since it was enacted, and it has 
become an important element of lawsuits that have been filed in the wake of 1 
October.55 
II. FIREARMS LEGISLATION IN NEVADA, POST-2019 
At the time of the 1 October shooting in 2017, Nevada had relatively 
permissive gun laws.56 For example, there was no law banning any number of 
firearms (rifles, shotguns, pistols and revolvers), even without a license and 
without registering them.57 Additionally, Nevada’s laws allowed people to 
openly carry firearms, or carry them concealed with a permit.58 Further, it was 
legal to possess a machine gun in Nevada as long as it was authorized by 
federal law.59 Finally, Nevada law did not restrict high-capacity magazines or 
large-caliber firearms.60 
 
such as spring guns, explosives, incendiary devices, and hoax bombs. NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 202.255, 202.260, 202.263 (2021). 
52  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2021). 
53  Hearing on S.B. 199 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 2003 Leg., 72nd Sess. 6–7 
(Nev. 2003) (statement of Stan Olson, Lobbyist, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t). 
54  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.253(4) (2019). Although Nevada lawmakers have changed the 
location of this definition within the code, the language and substance have stayed 
consistent. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(8)(c) (prior to 2019 amendment) with NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 202.253(4) (2019) (showing that the definition of “machine gun” moved from 
the body of the statute to a separate definitions section in 2019). 
55  See, e.g., Defendant FN America’s Notice of Removal, Exhibit A, Complaint and Jury 
Demand at 29, Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company LLC, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01189-
APG-GWF (D. Nev. July 9, 2019), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Parsons Complaint]. 
56  Tanvi Misra, Why Las Vegas Has Such Lax Gun Laws, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:15 
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-02/why-las-vegas-has-such-lax-
gun-laws [https://perma.cc/42RJ-HGPL]. 
57  Emily Shugerman, Las Vegas Gun Laws: How Easy Is It to Buy Guns in Nevada? Very, 




58  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3657 (2020). 
59  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2020). 
60  Ray Rogers, Nevada’s Gun Laws Are Some of the Most Relaxed in the Country, 
BILLBOARD (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7982046/nevada-gun-
laws-detailed [https://perma.cc/H32G-T25E]. 
42 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 5  
In 2014, the Nevada Secretary of State received an initiative petition, 
which proposed an amendment to the statutory requirements for background 
checks for firearm purchasers.61 At the time of the petition’s submission, 
federal statute required criminal background checks for every gun purchased 
from a licensed dealer, but none were required if a person bought a gun from an 
unlicensed dealer, including dealers at gun shows.62 This initiative appeared on 
the ballot in the 2016 Nevada General Election as Question 1, proposing an 
amendment to NRS Chapter 202.63 The amendment required non-licensed 
dealers to conduct a background check before selling or transferring a firearm 
to another unlicensed person; thus, closing the so-called “gun show 
loophole.”64 To conduct this background check, both the buyer and seller 
would have to appear in person with the firearm before a federally licensed 
firearms dealer.65 The NRS amendment further required the background check 
to be conducted through the National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).66 In the 
2016 election, Question 1 passed by a slim margin of 50.45% to 49.55%, with 
fewer than ten thousand votes making the difference.67 
Because the initiative was approved by the voters, it was set to go into 
effect on January 1, 2017.68 However, this law hit a roadblock when the FBI 
informed the Nevada Department of Public Safety (DPS) that it would not 
perform the background checks as requested as part of the Act.69 The FBI 
stated in a letter to the Nevada DPS that “Nevada legislation regarding 
background checks for private sales cannot dictate how federal resources are 
applied,” and that private party background checks are the “responsibility of 
Nevada.”70 At the time, Nevada was performing background checks through 
the federal system because Nevada was designated a “Point of Contact” state 
by the FBI.71 
In addition to running purchasers through the federal database, Nevada 
used state databases to check mental health records and records of domestic 
 
61  Letter from Barbara K. Cegavske, Nevada Sec’y of State to Nevadans (2016). 
62  18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1)(A) (2015); NEV. SEC’Y OF ST., STATE OF NEVADA BALLOT 
QUESTIONS 2016, 4 (2016), https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4434 
[https://perma.cc/WSM2-VLQN] [hereinafter NEVADA BALLOT QUESTIONS 2016]. 
63  NEVADA BALLOT QUESTIONS 2016, supra note 62, at 2. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Nevada Background Checks for Gun Purchases, Question 1, BALLOTPEDIA 
https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Background_Checks_for_Gun_Purchases,_Question_1_(201
6) [https://perma.cc/SMH5-Z29N]. 
68  NEVADA BALLOT QUESTIONS 2016, supra note 62, at 13 (showing the Background Check 
Initiative, Section 9). 
69  Nev. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter on Background Check Act, No. 2016-12 
(Dec. 28, 2016) at 2. 
70  Id. at 4. 
71  Id. at 2. 
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violence: records that the FBI did not possess.72 Since the FBI would not 
perform the checks, the enforcement of the Act would bar Nevadans from 
privately buying and selling firearms.73 As such, Nevada Attorney General 
Adam Laxalt stated in an opinion letter to the Director of the Nevada DPS that 
Nevadans were “excused from compliance with the Act’s background check 
requirement.”74 The required private background checks were not conducted in 
2017, even though they were required by Nevada law; in effect, the law existed 
only on paper.75 Due to the Nevada Constitution preventing initiative measure 
amendment or repeal “within [three] years from the date it takes effect,” the 
background check requirement could not be updated until November 22, 
2019.76 
On September 25, 2017, just five days before the 1 October shooting, 
attorneys for Nevadans for Background Checks sent a letter and legal memo to 
then-Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval, urging him to initiate action to 
implement the background check requirement and threatening legal action to 
compel him to do so.77 The fact that the background check initiative had been 
passed by voters but had not been implemented by the state was scrutinized 
again after 1 October, because people wondered whether Paddock had legally 
purchased his firearms.78 
Shortly after the shooting, a lawsuit was filed against the state regarding 
the background check initiative implementation; however, it was later 
determined that Paddock had purchased his firearms legally.79 The Eighth 
Judicial District Court dismissed the suit on August 20, 2018.80 The case was 
appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, but the parties agreed to postpone 
 
72  Id. at 3. 
73  Id. at 4. 
74  Id. at 6–7. 
75  Riley Snyder, Legislative Gun Law Changes Inspired By October 1 Have Seen Middling 




76  NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2, para. 3. 
77  Letter from Mark Ferrario, Legal Counsel to Nevadans for Background Checks, 
Greenberg Traurig, to Brian Sandoval, Nevada Governor (Sept. 25, 2017). 
78  Riley Snyder & Megan Messerly, Days Before Mass Shooting on Strip, Gun Control 
Group Threatened Lawsuit if State Took No Action on Stalled Background Checks Ballot 




79  Riley Snyder, Indy Explains: The Seven-Year Battle to Implement Background Checks on 
Private Gun Sales, NEV. INDEP. (Feb. 12, 2019, 2:30 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/the-indy-explains-the-seven-year-battle-to-
implement-background-checks-on-private-gun-sales [https://perma.cc/VA23-EHPT]. 
80  Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Denying Alternative Request for 
Declaratory Relief, at 22, Zusi v. Sandoval, No. A-17-762975-W (Nev. Eighth Judicial 
District Ct. Aug. 20, 2018). 
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filing briefs until April 1, 2019.81 The case was never heard because the 
Nevada Legislature introduced a bill in early 2019, repealing the provisions of 
the Background Check Act and reenacting them without the requirement that 
the FBI perform the checks.82 The bill was passed into law and became 
effective on January 2, 2020.83 
On April 3, 2019, another firearms bill was introduced.84 Nevada 
Assembly Bill 272, as amended on April 11, 2019, required law enforcement 
agencies in Clark and Washoe counties to submit semiautomatic pistols and 
cartridge cases recovered from crime scenes or “reasonably believed to have 
been used in or associated with the commission of a crime” to a designated 
forensic laboratory for testing.85 The bill’s sponsor stated that, if AB 272 was 
adopted, more leads could be provided to investigators, which could result in 
more arrests for gun crimes and a significant drop in gun violence.86 This bill 
went into effect on October 1, 2019.87 
The most significant changes in firearm laws after 1 October were 
introduced to the Nevada Legislature through an omnibus bill, Assembly Bill 
291, on March 18, 2019.88 As introduced, this bill contained a ban on bump 
stocks, which would make the import, sale, manufacture, transfer, receipt, or 
possession of these devices a felony.89 At the time of AB 291’s introduction, 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had already 
issued the “Final Rule” which clarified the definition of “machine gun” in the 
Gun Control Act90 and National Firearms Act91 to include bump stocks.92 
However, the supporters of AB 291 stated that having bump stocks banned in 
 
81  Riley Snyder, supra note 79. 
82  S.B. 143 §§ 2, 3, 5, 9, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
83  Id. at § 10. 
84  Minutes of the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. 24 (Nev. Apr. 
3, 2019). 
85  A.B. 272 § 1(1)(b), 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). Upon receipt of the items, the 
forensic laboratory would be required to test fire the submitted firearms and input the test 
fired cartridge case into the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). 
A.B. 272 § 1(1)(c)(1–2), 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). Likewise, the lab would be 
required to input the evidence cartridge cases into NIBIN. Minutes of the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 84. NIBIN is a database operated by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives that allows shooting scenes to be linked together 
and, in turn, firearms to be linked to shooting scenes by comparing the information from the 
evidence and test-fired cartridge cases. Id. At the time of the bill’s introduction, only two 
states in the country had mandatory NIBIN-entry laws. Id. at 26. 
86  Minutes of the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 84. 
87  A.B. 272, Bill History, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/6495/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/4A2A-3TMB]. 
88  A.B. 291, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
89  Id. at § 1–2, 2019. 
90  18 U.S.C. § 923 (2018). 
91  26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2018). 
92  Bump Stock Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514, 66,519 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified 
at 27 C.F.R 447, 478–79). 
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Nevada would add value to the federal ban by giving state law the authority to 
prosecute violations.93 Additionally, the bill sought to reduce the allowable 
blood alcohol content for a person possessing a firearm from 0.10 to 0.08.94 
The bill also contained a provision to repeal the state firearm preemption, 
which restricted localities from enacting firearms laws or regulations.95 This 
provision was seen as a way to untie “the hands of local government,” due to 
the state legislature only meeting every other year.96 Nevadans believed this 
would be important in the aftermath of 1 October, because a locality may have 
been able to enact a bump stock ban more quickly than the state legislature.97 
When this bill was introduced, multiple speakers testified before the legislature, 
including a survivor of the 1 October shooting.98 
Eleven days after the introduction of AB 291, an amendment was 
proposed.99 The bill was changed significantly with this amendment in that the 
proposed repeal of state firearm preemption was removed.100 A “red flag” 
provision was added into the bill.101 This provision, also called an “extreme 
risk” law, had been enacted in fifteen other states prior to the amendment’s 
introduction.102 The amendment also provided that negligent storage of a 
firearm could result in a misdemeanor charge where there is a substantial risk 
that a child could obtain the firearm and injure herself or another with it.103 The 
legislature passed AB 291, and the “red flag,” bump stock ban, blood alcohol 
content, and safe storage provisions were enacted into law.104 New definitions 
were also included in this bill, with one notable definition added: that of a 
“semiautomatic firearm.”105 This definition, enacted on January 1, 2020, 
defines a “semiautomatic firearm” as any firearm that “uses a portion of the 
energy of a firing cartridge to extract the fired cartridge case and chamber the 
 
93  Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary and the Senate 
Committee on Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. 8 (Nev. Apr. 1, 2019). 
94  A.B. 291, § 3(1)(a), 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as introduced). 
95  Id. § 6; see also supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
96  Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary and the Senate 
Committee on Judiciary, supra note 93. 
97  Id. 
98  See, e.g., id. at 23 (showing the testimony of Heather Sallan, a survivor of the 1 October 
shooting). 
99  Minutes of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. 3 (Nev. May 29, 
2019). 
100  Id. at 28. 
101  Id. at 3. The law, if enacted, would allow law enforcement or family members to file a 
petition with the court outlining how a person exhibited high-risk behavior, demonstrating 
that he is a danger to himself or others. Id. at 4. A hearing would then be held and, if the 
person possessed firearms and was found to be a serious threat by clear and convincing 
evidence, the court could prohibit the person from having access to firearms and require law 
enforcement to take temporary possession of the person’s firearms. Id. 
102  Id. at 4. 
103  A.B. 291, § 28(5), 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (as enacted). 
104  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 33.500–33.670, 202.274, 202.257(5), 202.300(5)(a–b) (2021). 
105  A.B. 291, § 26(6), 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
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next shell or round; requires a separate function of the trigger to fire each 
cartridge; and is not a machine gun.”106 
III. PARSONS V. COLT’S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ET AL. 
This section outlines the Parsons case. At the time that this paper is written, 
this is an active case in front of the United States District Court, District of 
Nevada. The case arises from the 1 October shooting. Subsection A outlines the 
claims alleged by the plaintiffs. Subsections B-E summarize the motions filed 
throughout the case and the arguments contained within them. 
A. Parsons’s Claims107 
The Parsons case was filed as a result of the 1 October shooting. Carolyn 
Parsons was just one of the fifty-eight victims shot and killed on 1 October.108 
In an attempt to hold someone responsible for their daughter’s death, Carolyn’s 
parents filed a complaint in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court against the 
manufacturers and sellers of the semiautomatic rifles that Stephen Paddock 
fired into the festival’s audience.109 Her parents claim that the manufacturers 
and sellers of Paddock’s rifles are responsible for their daughter’s death 
because they knowingly violated federal and state laws prohibiting the 
manufacture and sale of machine guns.110 Parsons’s initial complaint included 
three causes of action: Death by Wrongful Act, Negligence Per Se, and 
Negligent Entrustment.111 
Federal and state statutes provide enumerated lists of specific firearm-
related acts that are unlawful.112 For example, “it shall be unlawful for a 
licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector 
 
106  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.253(6)(a–c) (2021) (emphasis added). 
107  The parties will be referred to using the Plaintiffs’ surname and the first named defendant 
(Colt’s). For consistency, they will be referred to with the pronoun “they” because there are 
multiple plaintiffs and defendants. Also, although the case is still pending, we italicize the 
named plaintiff when referring to the case for simplicity’s sake. 
108  See LVMPD CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF THE 1 OCTOBER MASS CASUALTY 
SHOOTING, 17, 19 (2018). 
109  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 10. On July 9, 2019, Defendant firearm 
manufacturer FN America filed a Notice of Removal based on complete diversity between 
the plaintiffs and all defendants, and the case was removed to the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada. Defendant FN America’s Notice of Removal, Parsons v. 
Colt’s Manufacturing Company LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-GWF (D. Nev. July 9, 
2019), ECF No. 1, at 2. Plaintiffs then filed a motion on August 8, 2019 to remand the case 
back to state court. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, Parsons v. Colt’s 
Manufacturing Company LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-EJY (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2019), ECF 
No. 50, at 1. The manufacturers and sellers filed a motion to dismiss on September 24, 2019. 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company 
LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-EJY (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2019), ECF No. 80, at 1 [hereinafter 
Colt’s Motion to Dismiss]. 
110  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 31. 
111  Id. at 29, 33–34. 
112  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1–9) (2018). 
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to sell or deliver to any person any . . . machine gun.”113 The term “machine 
gun” as defined in federal statute is “any weapon which shoots, is designed to 
shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, 
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.”114 Nevada law 
provides that “a person within this state shall not manufacture or cause to be 
manufactured, or import into the state, or keep, offer or expose for sale, or give, 
lend, possess or use a machine gun . . . unless authorized by federal law.”115 
The definition of “machine gun” in Nevada law is materially identical to that of 
the federal statute.116 
In the case of 1 October, there exists considerable argument surrounding 
whether Paddock’s AR-15s met the statutory definitions of “machine gun.”117 
Parsons’s complaint relies on portions of the machine gun definition, 
classifying a machine gun as “any weapon which . . . is designed to 
shoot . . . more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.”118 The 
complaint references an ATF interpretation of the “designed to shoot” 
language, which encompassed “those weapons which have not previously 
functioned as machine guns but possess design features which facilitate full 
automatic fire by simple modification or elimination of existing component 
parts.”119 Parsons alleges that, in selling the AR-15 rifles at issue, defendant 
manufacturers and sellers knowingly designed and sold firearms possessing 
design features that facilitated full-automatic fire by simple modification: bump 
stocks.120 
Parsons’s first cause of action in the complaint is an action for death by 
wrongful act.121 In a general sense, Nevada law permits such a cause of action: 
“[W]hen the death of any person . . . is caused by the wrongful act . . . of 
another, the heirs of the decedent . . . may each maintain an action for damages 
against the person who caused the death.”122 Parsons alleges that Colt 
committed wrongful acts by manufacturing and selling AR-15s, which Parsons 
alleges are machine guns, in knowing violation of state and federal machine 
gun statutes.123 Additionally, the complaint states that the AR-15s that Paddock 
 
113  18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4) (2018). 
114  26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2019). 
115  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2021). 
116  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.253(4) (2021) (defining machine gun as “any weapon which 
shoots, is designed to shoot or can be readily restored to shoot more than one shot, without 
manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger”). 
117  See, e.g., Transcript of Telephonic Motion Hearing, Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing 
Company LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-EJY (D. Nev. June 24, 2020), ECF No. 112, at 13, 
16–18 [hereinafter Telephonic Hearing]. 
118  26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2019). 
119  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 20 (quoting ATF ruling 82-2, 27 C.F.R. 179.11: 
Meaning of Terms). 
120  Id. at 30–31. 
121  Id. at 29. 
122  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085(2) (2021). 
123  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 31. 
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modified by adding bump stocks increased the risk that Carolyn would be shot 
or killed, and that a bullet from one of the firearms fired by him killed her.124 
The complaint lastly presumes that the events of 1 October would not have 
occurred but for the gun manufacturers and sellers producing and distributing 
the firearms, and therefore their actions were a proximate cause of Carolyn’s 
death.125 
Parsons’s second count in the complaint alleges negligence per se.126 If 
established, negligence per se means that an actor’s conduct is negligent “by 
itself” if the conduct “violates a statute that is designed to protect against the 
type of accident the actor’s conduct causes and if the accident victim is within 
the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”127 Parsons alleges that 
the federal and state machine gun statutes are intended to protect the public 
from physical injury and death from machine guns.128 The complaint further 
alleges that Carolyn is a member of the class of people that the statutes were 
enacted to protect and that she suffered the type of harm that the statutes were 
intended to prevent.129 
The complaint’s third count alleges negligent entrustment.130 Negligent 
entrustment is the “supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by 
another person when the seller knows, or reasonably should know, the person 
to whom the product is supplied is likely to, and does, use the product in a 
manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or 
others.”131 Parsons alleges that the manufacturers and sellers knew or should 
have known that the sale of the AR-15s posed an unreasonable risk of physical 
injury to others.132 The complaint further alleges that the manufacture and sale 
of these firearms constituted entrustments that posed an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others, including the victims of a foreseeable mass shooting.133 
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
Colt’s claimed that it was shielded from a lawsuit by the Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) in its motion to dismiss. On 
October 26, 2005, the PLCAA was signed into federal law.134 In drafting the 
PLCAA, Congress found that “[l]awsuits have been commenced against 
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as 
 
124  Id. at 31–32. 
125  Id. at 32. 
126  Id. at 33. 
127  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (AM LAW INST. 2010); Per 
se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 11th ed. 2019). 
128  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 33. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 34. 
131  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(B) (2018). 
132  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 34. 
133  Id. at 34–35. 
134  15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2018). 
Spring 2021]  GUNS IN THE SKY 49 
designed and intended, which seek money damages and other relief for the 
harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including criminals.”135 
The first stated purpose of the PLCAA is “to prohibit causes of action against 
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition 
products, and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the 
criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by 
others when the product functioned as designed and intended.”136 
The prohibition on filing suit against firearm manufacturers is not absolute; 
there are six exceptions listed in the PLCAA.137 Included in these exceptions 
are actions “brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per 
se.”138 Additionally, these exceptions permit actions “in which a manufacturer 
or seller . . . knowingly violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale 
or marketing of the product and the violation was a proximate cause of the 
harm for which relief is sought.”139 The statute further provides that “no 
provision of this Act shall be construed to create a public or private cause of 
action or remedy,” requiring a plaintiff’s asserted cause of action and requested 
remedy to arise from another state or federal statute.140 
To assert a valid claim against a firearm manufacturer or seller under a 
state or federal statute that permits a cause of action, a complainant must prove 
that the action meets one of the enumerated PLCAA exceptions, because all 
other qualified civil actions are expressly prohibited.141 Similar to the federal 
immunity provided to firearms manufacturers and sellers under the PLCAA, 
Nevada also has a statute which provides immunity to firearms manufacturers 
 
135  15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3) (2018). These lawsuits have been referred to as “Turley” suits 
after the large number of product liability suits filed against firearms manufacturers by one 
lawyer, Windle Turley, in the 1980s. Elaine Weiss, Guns in the Courts, THE ATLANTIC (May 
1983), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1983/05/guns-in-the-courts/489650/ 
[https://perma.cc/GQT6-ZJBE]. 
136  15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (2018). The PLCAA prohibits “qualified civil liability actions” in 
both federal and state courts. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a) (2018). The statute defines a “qualified 
civil liability action” in part as a 
civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a 
manufacturer or seller of a qualified product . . . for damages, punitive damages, injunctive 
or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from 
the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party. 
15 U.S.C. § 7903 (5)(A) (2018). A “qualified product” is defined in the statute as a “firearm” 
or “ammunition” or a “component part of a firearm or ammunition, that has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4) (2018). 
137  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i-vi) (2018). 
138  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii) (2018). 
139  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (2018). This exception is known as the “predicate exception” 
as it requires the plaintiff to assert that the defendant manufacturer or seller knowingly 
violated a state or federal statute (a “predicate” statute). Vivian Chu, The Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: An Overview of Limiting Tort Liability of Gun 
Manufacturers,  4–5 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
140  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(C) (2018). 
141  15 U.S.C. § 7903 (2018). 
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and sellers.142 To bring an action against the manufacturers and sellers of 
Paddock’s AR-15s, Parsons not only has to prove that Colt’s actions constitute 
an exception under the PLCAA, but that they also warrant piercing through 
Nevada’s immunity statute. The Nevada statute provides for a “[l]imitation on 
basis of liability of manufacturers and distributors of firearms and 
ammunition.”143 This limitation is provided in the statute’s first section, which 
states that “[n]o person has a cause of action against the manufacturer or 
distributor of any firearm or ammunition merely because the firearm or 
ammunition was capable of causing serious injury, damage or death, was 
discharged and proximately caused serious injury, damage or death.”144 The 
statute further provides that the first section is “declaratory and not in 
derogation of the common law.”145 Unlike the PLCAA’s six exceptions, the 
second section of the Nevada statute provides only one exception: for product 
liability.146 
In Parsons, Colt’s moved for dismissal, arguing that Parsons’s claims do 
not meet the PLCAA exceptions and were additionally barred by the Nevada 
immunity statute.147 Moreover, Colt’s motion to dismiss stated that Parsons 
failed to establish negligent entrustment under Nevada law and that a Nevada 
negligence per se claim cannot be based on an alleged violation of a penal 
statute absent legislative intent to impose civil liability.148 The motion also 
stated that the PLCAA only allows for negligence per se and negligent 
entrustment actions against firearms sellers, not manufacturers.149 Colt’s further 
argued that it did not knowingly violate federal and Nevada state machine gun 
statutes, because the AR-15s in question are not actually machine guns.150 If 
these contentions are true, Parsons’s entire claim must fail because each of the 
three causes of action are based on the defendant sellers’ and manufacturers’ 
assumed violation of the federal and state of Nevada machine gun statutes.151 
C. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
In rebuttal to Colt’s motion, and in further clarification of their arguments, 
Parsons filed a response urging the court to deny the motion to dismiss.152 
 
142  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.131 (2021). 
143  Id. 
144  Id. § 41.131(1). 
145  Id. 
146  Id. § 41.131(2) (“This section does not affect a cause of action based upon a defect in 
design or production. The capability of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, 
damage or death when discharged does not make the product defective in design”). 
147  Colt’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 109, at 3. 
148  Id. at 9, 11. 
149  Id. at 11. 
150  Id. at 12. 
151  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 31, 33- 34. 
152  Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Parsons v. Colt’s 
Manufacturing Company LLC, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-EJY (D. Nev. Nov. 22, 
2019), ECF No. 88, at 1 [hereinafter Parsons’s Opp.]. 
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Parsons reiterated their arguments classifying the AR-15s fired by Paddock as 
machine guns.153 Parsons did not claim that Paddock’s AR-15s were machine 
guns based on the first and third definitions of machine gun as provided in the 
statutory scheme.154 As stated in the complaint, Parsons relied only on the 
second part of the statutory definition of machine gun, which provides that a 
machine gun is “any weapon which . . . is designed to shoot . . . automatically 
more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the 
trigger.”155 In order to meet this definition, Parsons relied on the ATF ruling 
that provides that the “designed to shoot” definition includes “those weapons 
which have not previously functioned as machine guns but possess design 
features which facilitate full automatic fire by simple modification or 
elimination of existing component parts.”156 
Parsons reiterated their initial claims that the AR-15 rifle can be “shot 
automatically” with a shoestring or rubber band, and that the addition of a 
bump stock is a “simple modification” that “converted AR-15s into fully 
automatic machine guns.”157 Parsons asserted that one route to “simple 
modification” is through the use of bump stocks, but that “simple modification” 
is not confined to bump stocks.”158 To modify an AR-15 with a bump stock, the 
existing stock must be removed and a separate stock must then be attached in 
its place.159 Once a bump stock is attached, pulling the trigger allows the bump 
stock to harness and direct the energy of the recoil of the firearm, sliding the 
firearm back and forth so the trigger “automatically reengages” by “bumping” 
the shooter’s stationary finger without the shooter performing any additional 
trigger manipulation.160 
Parsons also restated their claims for negligence per se and negligent 
entrustment under Nevada law.161 Parsons stated that, under Nevada law, 
negligence per se occurs when there is a violation of a statute, the “injured 
party belongs to the class of persons that the statute was intended to protect, 
and the injury suffered is of the type the statute was intended to prevent.”162 
They alleged again that Colt’s manufactured and sold machine guns in 
violation of state and federal laws, and the purpose of those laws is to protect 
members of the public from physical injury and death, and that Parsons is a 
member of that class.163 Parsons then quoted two Nevada cases (a case 
involving a truck driver injured when struck by a train and a case regarding 
 
153  Id. at 3–5. 
154  Id. at 11. 
155  Id. at 10. 
156  Id. at 11 (quoting ATF ruling 1982-2, 27 C.F.R. 179.11: Meaning of Terms) (emphasis 
added). 
157  Id. at 17. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. at 23. 
160  Id. at 14 (quoting 83 Fed Reg 66,516(II)(B)). 
161  Id. at 19, 22. 
162  Id. at 19–20 (quoting Vega v. E Courtyard Associates, 24 P.3d 219, 221 (Nev. 2001)). 
163  Id. at 20 (quoting Parsons Complaint, Count II, para. 204, 206). 
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pedestrians killed by a drunk driver) where the court’s opinions recognized that 
the violation of a criminal statute can constitute negligence per se.164 Parsons 
distinguished two cases cited by Colt’s in support of Colt’s contention that, in 
the absence of legislative intent to create civil liability, the violation of a penal 
statute is not negligence per se, asserting that the aforementioned cases are only 
narrowly concerned with the negligent provision of alcohol.165 
In support of their negligent entrustment claim, Parsons stated that Nevada 
common law provides that negligent entrustment occurs when an 
instrumentality is entrusted “in circumstances where [the entrustor] knows or 
should [know] that such use may create an unreasonable risk of harm to 
others.”166 Parsons further alleged that the manufacturers and sellers knew or 
should have known that entrustment of the AR-15s to Paddock created an 
unreasonable risk because they could “easily be modified for automatic fire.”167 
Parsons claimed that they have adequately alleged causation.168 To 
establish a claim of negligence per se in Nevada, four elements must be shown: 
a statute or law exists to protect a class of people, the plaintiff was a member of 
the class, Colt’s violated the statute or law, and Colt’s violation proximately 
caused Parsons’s injury or damage.169 Parsons asserted that while criminal, 
third-party conduct typically severs the chain of causation, no severance occurs 
if the third party’s act is reasonably foreseeable.170 Parsons claimed that 
Paddock’s criminal conduct, using AR-15s equipped with bump stocks to 
commit a mass shooting, was foreseeable.171 
Finally, Parsons asserted that their claims were not barred by the Nevada 
firearm seller and manufacturer liability immunity statute.172 Parsons stated that 
the statute only prohibits causes of action brought “merely because the firearm 
or ammunition was capable of causing serious injury, damage or death.”173 
Parsons insisted that this is not their cause of action, but that their claim is 
based on the allegation that defendants knowingly violated federal and state 
laws by illegally manufacturing and selling machine guns.174 
 
164  Id. at 20 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Watkins, 83 Nev. 471 (1967) and Hamm v. 
Carson City Nugget, 85 Nev. 99 (1969)). 
165  Id. at 21 (citing Hindegardner v. Marcor Resorts, L.P.V., 108 Nev. 1091 (1993) and Bell 
v Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Eta Epsilon Chapter, 98 Nev. 109 (1982)). 
166  Id. at 22 (citing Mills v. Continental Parking Corp., 86 Nev. 724, 726 (1970)). 
167  Id. 
168  Id. at 23. 
169  Barnes v. Delta Lines, Inc, 99 Nev. 688, 690 (Nev. 1983). 
170  Parsons Opp., supra note 152, at 24 (citing Price v. Blaine Kern Artista, Inc., 893 P.2d 
367, 370 (Nev. 1995)). 
171  Id. at 23. 
172  Id. at 24. 
173  Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.131 (2021)). 
174  Id. at 24. 
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D. Defendants’ Reply in Further Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint and Analysis of Arguments 
In their reply, Colt’s most robust argument asserted that Plaintiffs’ 
allegations did not satisfy the predicate exception in the PLCAA.175 
Additionally, Colt’s claimed that they could not knowingly violate the state and 
federal machine gun statutes because Paddock’s AR-15s were not machine 
guns as defined in the National Firearms Act.176 Parsons alleged that the AR-
15s were machine guns due to the “designed to shoot automatically” definition, 
which they argued was further explained by the ATF Ruling, stating that 
firearms meet this definition when they “have not previously functioned as 
machine guns but possess design features which facilitate full automatic fire by 
simple modification or elimination of existing component parts.”177 Contesting 
this, Colt’s asserted that the AR-15s do not meet this definition because in 
order to facilitate full automatic firing, the firearm itself must be modified, not 
an existing part.178 The following five paragraphs will further discuss this 
subtle but important distinction. 
 The term “firearm” is defined as “any weapon (including a starter gun), 
which will, or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile 
by the action of an explosive [or] the frame or receiver of any such weapon.”179 
A frame or receiver is the main housing of the firearm.180 The frame or receiver 
holds the component parts of the firearm—items such as the hammer, bolt, 
breechblock, stock and barrel.181 The frame or receiver of the firearm is where 
its serial number is imparted.182 Because of these definitions, the frame or 
receiver constitutes the firearm itself, the other pieces of the firearm are un-
serialized component parts of the firearm.183 This is similar to the chassis of a 
car, the car’s “skeleton,” upon which the mechanical parts of the car such as the 
tires, axles and engine are fastened.184 
 
175  Defendants’ Reply in Further Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, 
Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company LLC, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-EJY (D. 
Nev. Dec. 20, 2019), ECF No. 92, at 3 [hereinafter Colt’s Reply]. 
176  Id. at 9 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2018)). 
177  Id. at 4 (quoting ATF ruling 1982-2, 27 C.F.R. 179.11: Meaning of Terms). 
178  See id. 
179  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2018). 
180  27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2018). 
181  Id. 
182  Firearms Verification Overview, ATF.GOV, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/firearms-
guides-importation-verification-firearms-ammunition-firearms-verification-overview 
[https://perma.cc/Q8HW-FUJL]. 
183  Gun Control Act Definitions: Firearm, ATF.GOV, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/firearms-
guides-importation-verification-firearms-ammunition-gun-control-act-definitions 
[https://perma.cc/237M-CFLU]. 
184  Difference Between Frame and Chassis, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN, 
https://whyisdifference.com/miscellaneous/difference-between-frame-and-chassis.html 
[https://perma.cc/65ZG-J22M]. 
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Parsons relies on the “designed to shoot automatically” definition to allege 
that Paddock’s AR-15s are machine guns, because it is the only definition that 
allows them to make that claim.185 However, as Colt’s observes, to meet this 
definition, a firearm must be able to fire automatically when an existing 
component part is eliminated or simply modified.186 The AR-15s would meet 
this definition if by merely eliminating the firearms’ existing stocks or 
modifying them, for example by grinding or filing on them, the rifles would 
shoot fully automatically. However, Parsons stated repeatedly in their 
complaint that the AR-15s possess design features which facilitate fully 
automatic fire by simple modification: modification of the firearm with a bump 
stock (removing the existing stock from the receiver and replacing it with a 
bump stock).187 Here, Paddock did not perform a “simple modification or 
elimination of existing component parts” (removing the existing stock or 
modifying it as it remained on the receiver); instead, as conceded repeatedly by 
Parsons, he performed modifications of the firearms themselves by removing 
the existing stocks from the AR-15s and replacing them with bump stocks.188 
Colt’s argued that Parsons’s assertion does not meet the requirements of the 
law.189 They contended that the AR-15s in question cannot meet the stated 
definition of a machine gun.190 For the AR-15s to be considered machine guns, 
an alternate definition of machine gun would have to be created, defining a 
machine gun as “a weapon that can be modified to fire automatically . . . based 
on the replacement of existing parts with readily available parts.”191 
This argument is quite persuasive. For Parsons’s interpretation to meet the 
current definition, the “designed to shoot automatically” definition would have 
to be altered in a subtle but meaningful way: through the addition of a single 
comma. It would have to state, “Firearms are considered machine guns if they 
have not previously functioned as machine guns but possess design features 
which facilitate full-automatic fire by simple modification, or elimination of 
existing component parts.” This rendering would allow “simple modification” 
to refer only to the firearm and “elimination” to refer only to the existing 
component parts. The definition as written does not include a comma, so 
“simple modification or elimination” refers only to “existing component parts.” 
This is further explained in ATF Ruling 82-2, which identifies 
modification of an existing component part, rather than modification of the 
firearm itself, as a prerequisite for being considered a machine gun. The ATF 
Ruling concerns the KG-9 pistol, defining it as a machine gun, because it had 
an existing “component part” called a disconnector that prevented more than 
 
185  Colt’s Reply, supra note 175, at 3. 
186  Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
187  Defendant FN America’s Notice of Removal, Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company 
LLC, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-GWF (D. Nev. July 9, 2019), ECF No. 1, at 29-31. 
188  Colt’s Reply, supra note 175, at 4. 
189  Id. at 4–5. 
190  Id. at 5. 
191  Id. 
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one shot from being fired with a single function of the trigger.192 The ATF 
Ruling supports the interpretation that the “simple modification or elimination” 
language refers only to the existing component parts, because it states that “the 
disconnector is designed in the KG-9 pistol in such a way that a simple 
modification to it, such as cutting, filing or grinding, allows the pistol to 
operate automatically.”193 The ATF Ruling does not provide any examples of 
any firearms other than the KG-9 pistol, and it does not provide any examples 
where a firearm itself, rather than a component part, was modified.194 The 
ATF’s interpretation is supported further in a case from the Eleventh Circuit, 
S.W. Daniel, Inc. v. United States, where the Court provided an explanation of 
the Ruling.195 That court stated that if 
parts A, B, and C are needed to make a machine gun. . . . [And a] firearm 
contains parts A, B, and E, and a simple modification of part E can transform it 
into part C, then . . . all the essential components from which a machine gun 
“can be assembled” are in the possession of the one person who holds 
the . . . weapon.196 
Using this explanation, it is obvious that this is not what occurred with 
Paddock’s AR-15s. In order to turn the AR-15s into machine guns, the existing 
stocks (part E in this example) would need to be removed and replaced with 
bump stocks (part C). The existing stocks on the AR-15s (part E) are not 
transformed into bump stocks (part C). 
Moreover, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada has 
previously held that a rifle stock is a component part.197 Under the current 
definition of machine gun and the interpretation provided by the ATF Ruling, 
for Paddock’s AR-15s to be classified as machine guns, automatic fire must 
have been achieved by simply eliminating (removing) the existing stocks, 
which Plaintiffs did not assert.198 Similarly, Parsons did not assert that a 
“simple modification” (cutting, filing or grinding) of the existing stocks would 
cause the AR-15s to fire automatically; they assert only that a “simple 
modification” of the AR-15s themselves (removing one component part from 
the receiver and replacing it with another) would transform the AR-15s into 
machine guns.199 Therefore, Parsons’s assertions do not place Paddock’s AR-
15s into the current definition of machine gun. 
Current laws about bump stocks further support Colt’s view of the case. On 
March 26, 2019, the ATF Final Rule went into effect, clarifying that the 
 
192  ATF ruling 82-2, 27 C.F.R. 179.11: Meaning of Terms. 
193  Id. 
194  See id. 
195  S.W. Daniel, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 253, 254 (11th Cir. 1987). 
196  Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5845). 
197  Prescott v. Slide Fire Sols., LP, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1189 (D. Nev. 2018). 
198  Colt’s Reply, supra note 175, at 4. 
199  Id. 
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definition of “machine gun” includes bump stocks.200 On June 14, 2019, NRS 
202.274 went into effect, providing for a ban on bump stocks.201 That statute 
includes a provision that reads 
a person shall not import, sell, manufacture, transfer, receive or 
possess: . . . [a]ny semiautomatic firearm that has been modified in any way that 
eliminates the need for the operator of the semiautomatic firearm to make a 
separate movement for each individual function of the trigger and: (1) 
[m]aterially increases the rate of fire of the semiautomatic firearm; or (2) 
[a]pproximates the rate of fire of a machine gun.202 
When the Nevada legislature enacted the bump stock ban, it had the 
opportunity to enact further firearms legislation.203 In that legislative session 
following 1 October, the legislature could have enacted further firearms bans 
such as an “assault weapons” ban on AR-15s or a ban on large caliber firearms 
or high-capacity magazines, but it did not do so. Similarly, it did not repeal 
state preemption for firearms laws, leaving the regulation of firearms within the 
“exclusive domain of the [State] Legislature.”204 During that same legislative 
session, the definition of “semiautomatic firearm” was added to the NRS.205 
This definition provides that a “semiautomatic firearm” is any firearm that is 
“not a machine gun.”206 Because the Nevada legislature has not banned AR-
15s, they remain federally legal and legal in the state. AR-15s only become 
“machine guns” upon the installation of a bump stock, and that transformation 
which has only occurred since the bump stock ban was enacted on March 26, 
2019.207 
Colt’s further asserted that Parsons did “not have valid negligence per se” 
and negligent entrustment claims.208 Colt’s stated that negligence per se 
requires a statute designed to protect a specific class of people, and Parsons’s 
interpretation that the machine gun statutes would be assumed to protect 
“members of the public” was too broad to qualify as a specific class.209 
Additionally, Colt’s asserted that Parsons incorrectly argued that violation of a 
penal statute is negligence per se in absence of legislative intent.210 Colt’s 
 
200  Bump Stock Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 27 
C.F.R 447, 478–79). 
201  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.274 (2021). 
202  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.274(1)(c)(1-2) (2021). 
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204  NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.364(1)(b) (2021). 
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further stated that the Hamm case, cited by Parsons, actually supported Colt’s 
argument: the Hamm court did not allow negligence per se against a tavern 
keeper who provided alcohol to a driver that struck and killed pedestrians 
because the statutes at issue there were part of the statutory scheme regulating 
the sale of alcohol.211 The machine gun statutes regulate the sale of firearms in 
a similar manner. Finally, Colt’s stated that a negligent entrustment action 
should not be recognized because manufacturers and sellers relinquish the right 
to control the product at the time of sale.212 
E. Oral Arguments and Opinions on Motions and the Certification of 
Questions to the Nevada Supreme Court 
On March 18, 2020, the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada heard oral arguments on Parsons for both the Motion to Remand and 
the Motion to Dismiss.213 The court quickly denied the Motion to Remand.214 
Afterward, Parsons and Colt’s each briefly argued their positions on the Motion 
to Dismiss.215 Generally, Colt’s reiterated their claim that Paddock’s AR-15s 
were not machine guns while Parsons asserted that they were.216 The court took 
the issue under advisement and subsequently issued an opinion on April 10, 
2020.217 
The court dismissed the negligent entrustment and negligence per se claims 
against the manufacturers, stating that the PLCAA only allows those claims 
against sellers who are “engaged in the business” as firearms dealers and are 
licensed to “engage in business” as firearms dealers.218 The court stated that 
under Nevada law, a negligent entrustment claim only applies 
where one who has the right to control [an instrumentality] permits another to 
use it in circumstances where he knows or should know that such use may create 
an unreasonable risk of harm to others, [but] it does not apply when the right to 
control is absent.219 
Here, the manufacturers and sellers had no right to control the AR-15s after 
they manufactured and sold them.220 Because negligent entrustment is based on 
the entrustor’s knowledge of the entrustee, not on his knowledge of the item 
entrusted, the claim failed: the manufacturers and dealers did not know that 
permitting Paddock to use AR-15s would create an unreasonable risk of 
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harm.221 The court dismissed the negligence per se claim based on precedent 
that there is a presumption that a violation of a penal statute is not negligence 
per se absent legislative intent.222 
The court held that Parsons properly alleged a wrongful death claim that is 
not precluded by the PLCAA.223 Parsons’s allegations survived the Motion to 
Dismiss when they asserted that Colt’s knew that bump stocks allowed their 
AR-15s to fire automatically through simple modification, and therefore they 
knowingly manufactured and sold weapons “designed to shoot” 
automatically.224 The court further held that a fact finder could conclude that 
Paddock’s use of an AR-15 modified with a bump stock was reasonably 
foreseeable.225 The court declined to make a decision on Colt’s immunity from 
liability under the Nevada immunity statute, stating that Nevada courts had yet 
to interpret it.226 
The court opted to certify the following questions to the Supreme Court of 
Nevada for interpretation: 
Does a plaintiff asserting a wrongful death claim premised on allegations that 
firearms manufacturers and dealers knowingly violated federal and state 
machine gun prohibitions have “a cause of action against the manufacturer or 
distributor of any firearm . . . merely because the firearm or ammunition was 
capable of causing serious injury, damage or death, was discharged and 
proximately caused serious injury, damage or death[,]” under Nevada Revised 
Statutes § 41.131? 
Does Nevada Revised Statutes § 41.131 allow a wrongful death claim premised 
on allegations that firearms manufacturers and dealers knowingly violated 
federal and state machine gun prohibitions because the statute is "declaratory 
and not in derogation of the common law"?227 
After this opinion was published, Parsons moved for reconsideration of the 
court’s order to dismiss the negligence per se claim.228 Parsons argued that 
because two questions of law were certified to the Nevada Supreme Court, and 
that the negligence per se claim presented an open question of state law, that 
claim should also be certified.229 Colt’s argued that the negligence per se issue 
had already been decided and did not warrant reconsideration.230 The court held 
that the Nevada Supreme Court had not addressed negligence per se in this 
context and that certification of the additional question would “save time, 
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223  Id. at *16. 
224  Id. at *15–16. 
225  Id. at *17. 
226  Id. at *19. 
227  Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Parsons v. Colt’s 
Manufacturing Company LLC, et al., No. 2:19-cv-01189-APG-GWF (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 
2020), at 1. 
228  See Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, Parson’s v. Colt’s Manufacturing 
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energy and resources.”231 Additionally, the court reasoned that the added 
question had important public policy ramifications for the state, so it amended 
its certification order to include the following question: “Under Nevada law, 
can a plaintiff assert a negligence per se claim predicated on violations of 
criminal federal and state machine gun prohibitions absent evidence of 
legislative intent to impose civil liability?”232 Although the court had initially 
dismissed the negligence per se claim against the manufacturers because the 
PLCAA only allowed that claim against sellers, the court stated that, if the 
Supreme Court of Nevada’s answer to the certified question allows the claim to 
proceed, it would allow Plaintiffs to amend their claim to plead that the 
manufacturers are subject to suit as sellers under the PLCAA.233 
IV. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 
 In the Parsons case, the United States District Court for the District of 
Nevada certified three questions to the Nevada Supreme Court.234 This section 
will examine and analyze each question. Based on that analysis, 
recommendations for ruling on the questions will be made to the Nevada 
Supreme Court. 
The Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 5 (NRAP 5) provides a 
mechanism for federal courts to seek to receive a written opinion from the 
Nevada Supreme Court answering certified questions of Nevada state law.235 
The three questions certified to the Nevada Supreme Court in Parsons involved 
two issues of law: (1) whether a wrongful death claim premised on allegations 
that firearms manufacturers knowingly violated state and federal machine gun 
statutes was allowable under NRS 41.131 and (2) whether a negligence per se 
claim premised on the same allegations of criminal statute violations was 
permitted absent legislative intent to impose civil liability.236 
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A. Allegations of Machine gun Statute Violations, NRS 41.131, and Policy 
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that the 
plaintiffs’ claim alleging wrongful death based on machine gun statute 
violations did not warrant dismissal under the PLCAA’s predicate exception. 
However, for the claim to proceed, the district court still needs to decide if the 
claim is barred under NRS 41.131.237 NRS 41.131 provides the following: 
Limitation on basis of liability of manufacturers and distributors of firearms and 
ammunition 
1.  No person has a cause of action against the manufacturer or distributor of 
any firearm or ammunition merely because the firearm or ammunition was 
capable of causing serious injury, damage or death, was discharged and 
proximately caused serious injury, damage or death. This subsection is 
declaratory and not in derogation of the common law. 
2.  This section does not affect a cause of action based upon a defect in design 
or production. The capability of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, 
damage or death when discharged does not make the product defective in 
design.238 
The district court declined to decide whether the wrongful death claim was 
barred under NRS 41.131.239 Because the Parsons case is pending, it involves a 
question of Nevada law which may be determinative, and no controlling 
precedent was found, the court certified two questions about this statute to the 
Nevada Supreme Court for it to address (1) whether Parsons has a cause of 
action and (2) whether the declaratory nature of the statute is dispositive.240 
The Nevada Supreme Court reviews statutory interpretation questions de 
novo.241 In statutory interpretation cases, the Court normally starts by looking 
at the statute’s plain language.242 However, if the statute is ambiguous and 
could reasonably be interpreted multiple ways, the Court will look at 
“legislative history, reason, and public policy to discern legislative intent.”243 
Before going directly to the plain language, the statute’s placement may 
provide helpful context for the reader, although the Court may decide not to 
consider the statute’s placement. NRS 41.131 is located in the chapter of 
statutes regarding “Actions and Proceedings in Particular Cases Concerning 
Persons.”244 Within that chapter, the statute is listed under the section titled 
“Actions for Personal Injuries by Wrongful Act, Neglect or Default.”245 The 
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first statute in this section regards liability for personal injury and provides that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided . . . whenever any person shall suffer personal 
injury by wrongful act, neglect or default of another, the person causing the 
injury is liable to the person injured for damages.”246 This provision establishes 
that the default condition for a wrongful death is to hold the responsible party 
liable. The remaining statutes in this section provide limitations and conditions 
on that default liability.247 
The first certified question seeks an answer to the meaning of the “merely 
because” language of the statute. Starting with the plain meaning of the statute, 
Parsons states that NRS 41.131, on its face, simply does not apply.248 The plain 
language of the statute provides that “[n]o person has a cause of action against 
the manufacturer or distributor of any firearm or ammunition merely because 
the firearm or ammunition was capable of causing serious injury, damage or 
death, was discharged and proximately caused serious injury, damage or 
death.”249 Appellant Parsons are not asserting a claim “merely because” the 
firearms at issue were capable of causing serious injury and did so; their claim 
asserts that the gun companies are liable because they committed a wrongful 
act, producing machine guns in violation of state and federal machine gun 
statutes, and should therefore be held liable for the wrongful death that resulted 
from the production of those illegal arms.250 Parsons asserts that the statute is 
narrow, because “merely” means “simply” or “solely,” so it only bars no-fault 
claims—not a liability claim as is the default condition—the exemption in the 
statute is the sole allowable exception.251 
Gun company Respondents assert that the plain language of NRS 
41.131(1) is broad.252 Respondents state that if the firearm operates as 
designed, then a claim is not allowed, regardless of “who caused the harm, what 
type of firearm was used, or which theory of liability is alleged.”253 Colt’s 
asserts that this statute is protective of the gun companies and therefore should 
be liberally construed.254 Colt’s further states that a narrow interpretation of the 
statute to preclude only strict liability claims would render the statute’s primary 
immunity provision meaningless and lead to an absurd result.255 
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Additional questions regarding the wording of the statute arose during oral 
argument on the certified questions.256 The Court asked Parsons’s counsel 
whether the phrase “any firearm” includes illegal firearms.257 The Court further 
stated that if “any firearm” includes illegal firearms, then the subsequent 
analysis of the “merely because” language, and what the statute’s liability 
encompasses, may be unnecessary because blanket immunity—including for 
the manufacturing and sale of illegal firearms—would be provided.258 This 
interpretation is consistent with Respondents’ argument and was particularly 
concerning to the United States District Court: that the statute provides 
immunity to all sellers and manufacturers and would immunize a defendant 
who “manufactured and sold Tommy guns or M-16 rifles to civilians.”259 
However, even if “any firearm” includes illegal firearms, the “merely because” 
language exists, which would require the statute to be read as “no person has a 
cause of action against the manufacturer or distributor of [an illegal] firearm 
merely because the firearm . . . was capable of causing serious injury, damage 
or death.”260 
The second certified question regarding NRS 41.131 focuses on the 
language provided that the statute is “declaratory and not in derogation of the 
common law.”261 Parsons asserts that this language “declare[s] the law to be 
what it already is” and “does not alter the common law;” that those who 
commit wrongful or negligent acts are responsible for the injuries they cause.262 
Under the narrow interpretation of this statute that Parsons argues, if there is a 
claim against gun companies solely based on the fact that a gun fired as 
designed, and not based on allegations of wrongful or neglectful conduct, that 
claim must fail.263 Colt’s asserts that a “declaratory statute clarifies the existing 
common law”264 and leaves it “more clearly in force.”265 Colt’s further states 
that this expressed language acts to ensure that the statute would not be broadly 
construed to include causes of action arising from using non-defective 
firearms.266 
 
256  See Oral Argument at 15:57, Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company, LLC, et al., No. 
81034 (Mar. 2, 2021), https://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Arguments/Recordings/81034-
_Parsons_vs__Colt_s_Manufacturing_Co__LLC/ [https://perma.cc/M5RA-VVCY]. 
257  Id. at 19:15. Parsons’ counsel responded, “Yes, I think it does.” Id. at 19:30. 
258  Id. at 21:10. 
259  Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65341, at *19. (D. 
Nev. April 10, 2020) (referring to Defendants’ concession during oral argument in front of 
the District Court). 
260  Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.131(1) (showing the actual language of the statute). 
261  Amended Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada, supra note 234, 
at 3. 
262  Parsons Opening Brief, supra note 248, at 15–16. 
263  Id. at 16. 
264  Colt’s Answering Brief, supra note 252, at 17 (citing State v. Babayan, 106 Nev. 155, 
169 (1990)). 
265  Id. (quoting Deboer v. Fattor 72 Nev. 316, 320 (1956)). 
266  Id. 
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Because statutory interpretation is often an exercise in discerning 
legislative intent, the Court will look at legislative history, reason, and public 
policy if the plain language is not dispositive.267 NRS 41.131 was first 
introduced to the Nevada legislature in 1985 as Senate Bill 211.268 As 
introduced, the bill summary stated that the bill “limits liability for manufacture 
of firearms and ammunition”: 
Chapter 41 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section to read 
as follows: 
1.   In an action for liability based on a defective product, a firearm or 
ammunition shall not be deemed defective in design on the basis that the 
benefits of the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its capability 
to cause serious injury, damage or death when discharged[.] 
2.   For the purposes of this section: 
(a) The capability of a firearm or ammunition to cause serious injury, damage or 
death when discharged does not make the product defective in design. 
(b) Injuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm or ammunition 
are not proximately caused by its capability to cause serious injury, damage or 
death but by the actual discharge of the product. 
3.   This section does not affect a cause of action based upon improper 
selection among alternative designs.269 
In the initial testimony on the bill, one of its sponsors stated, “[T]his bill is 
the result of activity by the National Rifle Association to prevent harassment of 
gun dealers and gun manufacturers . . . [S]uits have been filed, claiming that 
there is a fault with the weapon, if it caused an injury or death.”270 
To clarify the intent of the bill, the committee members testified that they 
wished to redraft the bill, “so that a gun in itself is not to be determined as at 
fault in case of a death or injury, unless the weapon is faulty in design, 
materials or workmanship” and “[w]hat is needed . . . is to say plainly that the 
fact that a firearm either causes or is capable of causing death or serious injury, 
does not make it defective in design, because, after all, it is meant to cause 
death or serious injury when used deliberately.”271 Peter Chase Neuman of the 
Nevada Trial Lawyers Association stated that the bill should state the intent of 
the NRA, that “the mere fact that an accident or injury or death occurs under 
circumstances involving the discharge of a firearm, does not in itself constitute 
any evidence of defect”272 and that the concern here is that 
 
267  Guzman v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 460 P.3d 443, 447 (Nev. 2020) (“Statutory 
interpretation concerns determining legislative intent, and the starting point is the statute’s 
plain language. . . . [W]hen the statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable 
interpretations, the statute is ambiguous, and this court may then look to other tools such as 
legislative history, reason, and public policy to determine legislative intent.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
268  S.B. 211, 1985 Leg., 63rd Sess. (Nev. 1985) (as introduced). 
269  Id. 
270  Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 1985 Leg., 63rd Sess. 1 (Nev. Mar. 13, 
1985). 
271  Id. at 2. 
272  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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if someone gets injured or killed by a gun, then the manufacturer or vendor of 
that gun is somehow going to be automatically liable, just because they made the 
gun . . . it would be an abuse of the use of that product, and therefore the 
manufacturer is not liable under present law.273 
After this testimony, the bill was amended, nearing the final language of NRS 
41.131: 
No person has a cause of action against the manufacturer or distributor of any 
firearms or ammunition merely because firearms and ammunition are capable, 
when the firearm is discharged, of causing death, substantial bodily harm or 
damage to property. This section is declaratory and not in derogation of the 
common law.274 
It is evident that this amended version of the bill includes specific wording 
provided in the testimony in an attempt to memorialize the intent of the drafters 
to say that evidence of defect does not exist based on the “mere fact that an 
accident or injury or death occurs under circumstances involving the discharge 
of a firearm,” and that the manufacturer cannot be presumed liable simply for 
the manufacture of the gun is what the law provided at the time of this 
drafting.275 The testimony provided after this amendment and before the bill 
passed in its final form is scant, but what it does provide is blunt: “What the 
[c]ommittee wants to convey is that if someone shoots a firearm and hurts 
somebody, you can’t sue the firearms manufacturer because it shoots.”276 There 
is no discussion in the legislative history regarding any other type of immunity 
or that this statute was intended as something other than a products liability 
statute. Although the plain language of the statute may be construed multiple 
ways, the legislative history is very persuasive in favor of the Parsons’s narrow 
interpretation, that the statute is not intended to broadly immunize 
manufacturers and sellers from all causes of action but was intended to codify 
the existing laws of products liability. 
If the Nevada Supreme Court uses the legislative history to interpret NRS 
41.131, it should answer “no” to the first certified question. Plaintiffs asserting 
a wrongful death claim based on machine gun statute violations instead have a 
cause of action based on the alleged violation of criminal statutes, not a cause 
of action based strictly on manufacturing a product that was used in its intended 
manner, resulting in death. 
Additionally, should the Court further rely on the legislative history in 
making its decision on the second certified question, it should answer in the 
affirmative. Plaintiffs’ asserted claim does not contradict the statute’s language 
providing that the statute was declaring the current law as it existed at the time. 
The legislative history of the statute supports the interpretation that the statute 
was codifying the products liability law that existed at the time of its writing, 
that a manufacturer is not liable just because it made a gun that was used in a 
 
273  Id. (emphasis added). 
274  S.B. 211, 1985 Leg., 63rd Sess. (Nev. 1985) (first reprint). 
275  Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, supra note 270 (emphasis added). 
276  Id. at 12. 
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shooting. That is not what the Parsons are alleging; they are alleging a cause of 
action based on violation of state and federal statutes.277 In the situation at 
hand, should the claim proceed, the question regarding whether the AR-15s 
used by Paddock were indeed “machine guns” will determine the course of the 
suit. If the answer to this question is in the negative, then the claims are 
baseless and must fail because no violations of the machine gun statutes could 
exist. 
As stated by the United States District Court, because NRS 41.131 has 
never been interpreted, its interpretation here will have public policy 
implications for the state.278 If plaintiffs in Nevada can state a civil cause of 
action against firearms manufacturers and sellers for statutory violations, large 
numbers of lawsuits could follow, resulting in a new “Turley” era.279 This 
particular argument, that a certain decision will cause a “slippery slope” and 
open the “floodgates of litigation” is often used in policy arguments.280 Here, if 
the Nevada legislature, which has “exclusive domain” over regulation and 
policies concerning firearms, desires to provide blanket manufacturer 
immunity, it would need to codify this in the NRS.281 In order to clarify the 
legislature’s intent, NRS 41.131 should be amended to look more like the 
PLCAA, to expressly provide for manufacturer immunity except in specific 
situations. 
B. Allegations of Machine Gun Statute Violations, Negligence Per Se, and 
Policy 
Originally, the United States District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ negligence 
per se claim against the gun companies.282 The court stated that the Nevada 
Supreme Court had previously rejected these claims in two cases, holding that a 
penal statute violation, in the absence of “legislative intent to impose civil 
liability . . . is not negligence per se.”283 Both cases noted by the District Court 
contained violations of alcohol laws, and in Hinegardner v. Marcor Resorts, 
L.P.V., the Supreme Court inferred that the Legislature did not intend to impose 
civil liability via negligence per se because it was silent on the matter.284 The 
District Court cited an additional Nevada Supreme Court decision rejecting a 
negligence per se claim based on a penal statute’s violation, because the 
 
277  Parsons Opening Brief, supra note 248, at 33. 
278  See Amended Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada, supra note 
234, at 4. 
279  See Elaine Weiss, supra note 135. 
280  See Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1060, 
1073 (2013). 
281  NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.364 (1)(b) (2021). 
282  Parsons v. Colt’s Manufacturing Company, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65341, at *10. (D. 
Nev. April 10, 2020). 
283  Id. at *9 (quoting Hinegardner v. Marcor Resorts, L.P.V., 108 Nev. 1091 (Nev. 1992)) 
(internal citation omitted). 
284  Id. (citing Hinegardner, 108 Nev. at 1091. 
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legislature had provided for civil liability in the section of the statute 
immediately preceding the one at issue.285 Although the District Court stated 
that one could argue that there is a presumption that negligence per se claims 
are not permitted absent legislative intent, or that a negligence per se claim is 
allowed without contradictory legislative intent, the court held that neither the 
state or federal machine gun statutes exhibited legislative intent to impose civil 
liability and dismissed the claim.286 Upon reconsideration, the court decided to 
certify the negligence per se question to the Nevada Supreme Court to “save 
time and judicial resources.”287 The final certified question states, “Under 
Nevada law, can a plaintiff assert a negligence per se claim predicated on 
violations of criminal federal and state machine gun prohibitions absent 
evidence of legislative intent to impose civil liability?”288 
A statutory violation “may constitute negligence per se only if the injured 
party belongs to the class of persons that the statute was intended to protect, 
and the injury is of the type that the statute was intended to prevent.”289 
Whether a statute “provides a standard of conduct in the particular situation 
presented by the plaintiff is a question of statutory interpretation and 
construction for the court.”290 In Nevada cases, there are instances where 
negligence per se was permitted based upon a duty in the statute, and where it 
was not permitted when a penal statute was violated.291 This illustrates that this 
claim weighs heavily on the interpretation of the statute. 
Federal statute provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to sell or deliver to 
any person any . . . machine gun.”292 Nevada statute provides that “a person 
within this state shall not manufacture or cause to be manufactured, or import 
into the state, or keep, offer or expose for sale, or give, lend, possess or use a 
machine gun . . . unless authorized by federal law.”293 Plaintiffs filed a claim 
 
285  Id. (citing Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, 85 Nev. 99 (Nev. 1969)). 
286  Id. at *10. 
287  Amended Order Certifying Questions to the Supreme Court of Nevada, supra note 234, 
at 3. 
288  Id. at 1 (listed as the first certified question in the Amended Order). 
289  Sagebrush Ltd. v. Carson City, 99 Nev. 204, 208 (1983); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM LAW INST. 1965) (“The court may adopt as the standard of 
conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative 
regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 
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290  Sagebrush Ltd., 99 Nev. at 208(citing Sobrio v. Cafferata 72 Nev. 145, 150, 297 P.2 828, 
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291  See, e.g., Hinegardner, 196 Nev. at 1096; Bell v Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Eta 
Epsilon Chapter, 98 Nev. 111, (1982); Vega v. Eastern Courtyard Assocs., 117 Nev. 436, 
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292  18 U.S.C § 922(b)(4) (2015). 
293  NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2021). 
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for negligence per se based on the alleged violation of these two statutes.294 
Both statutes are criminal statutes and neither explicitly states that civil liability 
may be imposed if the statute is violated.295 Because civil liability is not 
addressed in the plain language of the statute, the Court may look to the 
legislative history to determine if legislature intended to impose such liability. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides examples of where a court will not 
allow negligence per se based on the statute’s purpose.296 For example, courts 
that follow the Restatement will not allow negligence per se when the statute’s 
purpose exclusively “secure[s] to individuals the enjoyment of rights or 
privileges to which they are entitled only as members of the public.”297 The 
Nevada Supreme Court often looks to the Restatement when ruling on a 
negligence per se action;298 however, the Court has not cited this specific 
provision.299 
Federal statutes and their legislative history may help courts determine a 
state legislature’s purpose for passing laws that mirror federal law. The bill that 
became the “National Firearms Act” was originally titled “Taxation of 
Manufacturers, Importers, and Dealers in Certain Firearms and Machine Guns” 
and was introduced on June 13, 1934.300 The bill’s original intent, as stated at 
the legislative session where it was introduced, was “to stop gangsters from 
buying machine guns.”301 The St. Valentine’s Day Massacre, where members 
 
294  Parsons Complaint, supra note 55, at 33. 
295  See 18 U.S.C § 922(b)(4) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350(1)(b) (2021). 
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of one criminal gang allegedly killed seven members of another gang for 
control of bootlegging in Chicago, inspired the introduction of this 
legislation.302 The legislative session testimony on this bill stated that “this 
country has been at the mercy of the gangsters, racketeers and professional 
criminals. The rapidity with which they can go across state lines has become a 
real menace to the law-abiding people of this country.”303 The legislation 
provided for a tax on machine guns, which was expected to prevent 
“gangsters”—members of organized professional criminals—from purchasing 
machine guns and transporting them across state lines to commit criminal 
acts.304 This legislative history illustrates that this bill was intended to provide 
for a tax to be paid to the government, to make it difficult for gangsters to 
acquire machine guns, to protect “the law-abiding people” of the United States. 
The Nevada machine gun statute was specifically intended to “mirror federal 
law” to allow Nevada law enforcement to enforce these laws independent of 
federal involvement.305 
To assert a valid negligence per se claim, an injured party must belong to 
the class of persons “the statute was intended to protect.”306 The machine gun 
statutes, per their legislative history, were intended to protect the “law-abiding 
people” of the United States, in other words, the public at large.307 For a 
successful negligence per se claim, the statute must intend to protect a 
particular class of people, and the Restatement specifically exempts statutes 
intended “to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which 
they are entitled only as members of the public.”308 While other negligence per 
se cases have determined that the actor owed a duty of care to the “general 
public,” it was limited by the facts of the case, such as where a railroad owes a 
duty to the general public “to maintain a reasonably safe crossing.”309 If the 
federal and state machine gun statutes at issue here were allowed to be used as 
a basis for negligence per se, the Court would have to determine that the gun 
companies had a duty to protect the entire public at large, which is a class of 
people far too broad to include. Therefore, when examining legislative history 
for the third certified question, the Court should determine a plaintiff may not 
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assert a negligence per se claim predicated on violations of criminal federal and 
state machine gun prohibitions. 
The decision on this third certified question will carry public policy 
implications for the State of Nevada. If the Court decides that the negligence 
per se claim can persist, many suits could follow, alleging that violations of 
criminal statutes may include civil actions under the theory of negligence per 
se. To clarify this issue, the Legislature would need to codify its intent in the 
NRS. This could be done by amending each specific statute, including the 
machine gun statute, to explicitly state whether civil liability is allowed. More 
efficiently, the entire NRS would benefit from a blanket provision, stating that 
civil liability is not allowed for negligence per se claims pursuant to criminal 
statutes without express legislative language to that effect. 
CONCLUSION 
In Nevada’s nascent days, legislators had to make many decisions. There 
was a myriad of policy issues to address, each issue shaping Nevada’s future in 
its own way. Issues such as slavery and mining regulation were at the forefront 
of the Nevada founders’ minds, and firearm regulation was not a predominant 
social topic. However, the Wild West, with its wide-open spaces and promises 
of wealth, quickly drew the interest of outlaws, and the outlaw gunfighters 
brought their firearms. Early Nevada legislators faced the challenge of writing a 
constitution and enacting a body of law where laws had never existed. In some 
ways, these challenges have not abated. The legislature of today also has a 
difficult job because it is faced with the challenge of amending the existing 
body of law, and enacting new laws, to contend with challenges that have never 
existed before. 
Laws are never enacted in a vacuum; they frequently arise in response to a 
significant event, often a tragedy, when lawmakers realize that new or updated 
legislation is needed to properly address a previously non-existent situation. 
However, reactive laws end up representing a “snapshot” of a moment in time, 
and future courts then have the complex and puzzling task of determining what 
the drafters intended when the law was written. This task can be daunting when 
trying to apply old laws to novel situations. Questions about how to interpret 
statutes may seem simple on the surface, but it would be irresponsible of 
legislators and judges to not consider current events, novel happenings, and 
policy implications when making their decisions. 
Since the 1 October shooting, lawmakers and judges have grappled with 
how to interpret Nevada laws in a new Nevada. At the time of the writing of 
this White Paper, the Parsons case is pending, awaiting the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s ruling on the certified questions. If the Supreme Court rules as this 
Paper has suggested, the Parsons’s district court wrongful death claim will 
proceed and the negligence per se claim will be dismissed. Then it will be up to 
the district court to decide if Paddock’s AR-15’s meet the statutory definitions 
of “machine gun.” If the district court rules that they do not, as this White 
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Paper has suggested, the wrongful death claim will then also be dismissed. The 
Nevada legislature will then determine if the NRS needs to be amended to 
clarify firearms manufacturer liability, negligence per se or the machine gun 
statute. 
The new post-1-October Nevada is quite different from the Wild West days 
of the state’s beginning. However, current legislators and judges are faced with 
decisions like those faced by the original Nevada lawmakers. They must figure 
out how to forge the future in a new world. It is our hope that this White Paper 
may provide some insights for the judges, legislators, and citizens when 
considering the issues that have emerged since the 1 October shooting. 
 
